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  • Torts accounts for 162 out of 705 casebriefs.

Style of causeRatio

Brunswick Construction Ltd v Nowlan (1974) 21 BLR 27, 49 DLR (3d) 93

Where there are concurrent torts, both contributing to the same damage (whether or not the damage would have occurred in the absence of either cause), either party causing or contributing to the damage is liable for whole damage to the plaintiff

Brushett v Cowan (1990), 69 DLR (4th) 743 (Nfld CA)

The full extent of consent is determined by looking at all of the circumstances arising from the doctor-patient relationship.

C v Wren (1986), 35 DLR (4th) 419 (Alta CA)

Age is not a barrier to consent; all that matters is that the person is able to understand the risks and benefits of treatment.

Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd, [1999] 1 SCR 142

Breach of confidence is a hybrid cause of action drawing on both equity and common law. Therefore judges have discretion in formulating remedies.

Caltagirone v Scozzari-Cloutier, [2007] OJ No 4003 (Sup Ct (Sm Cl))

6 questions to asks to determine whether it has been an actionable breach:
** 1. Would a reasonable person consider the information to be private?
** 2. Has the plaintiff consented to the collection of the information in some way?
** 3. Has the info been acquire for a legal process or public interest reason
** 4. Has the plaintiff consented to the disclosure or publication of that information?
** 5. If no consent, has the information been disclosed for legal or public interest reason?
** 6. Is the legal or public interest reason one that a reasonable person would consider to outweigh the interest of the individual in wanting to keep the information private

Campbell v SS Kresge Co Ltd et al, [1976] 74 DLR (3d) 717 (NSSC)

Restricting a person’s lawful movement by threat of non-physical harm given from a position of authority (duress) constitutes false imprisonment.

Cant v Cant (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 25 (Co Ct)

Recovery should be possible where the defendant calculatedly acted to cause the plaintiff harm or loss.

Caparo v Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL)

Recognition of a duty of care now turns on 3-part test:
** 1. The plaintiff’s loss was a reasonably foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s conduct;
** 2. There was a sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties;
** 3. It is “fair, just, and reasonable” for the court to impose a duty of care in light of the applicable policy considerations.

Cement LaFarge v BC Lightweight Aggregate, [1983] 1 SCR 452.

"Ex turpi" extends to illegal AND immoral conduct.

Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18

Social hosts of parties (where alcohol is served) do not owe a duty of care to third-parties who may be injured by intoxicated party guests.

Note that Canada is much harder on commercial establishments. There is a statutory cause of action in some provinces (over-serving someone is a cause of action), but they are much narrower than causes of action found in common law.

Clark v Canada (1994), 20 CCLT (2d) 241 (FCTD)

If it is an ongoing process calculated to achieve a certain end, this will be sufficient to meet the requirements for the intentional infliction of nervous shock.

Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32.

While it may be possible, in rare circumstances, for the "material contribution" test to apply, that it has never in fact been applied by the Supreme Court of Canada. Accordingly, the specific application of the "material contribution" test is an open issue that has yet to have been dealt with conclusively by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Material Contribution test can only be applied in cases of multi-tort feasors.

Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 E.R. 107.

Where the bailment is found to be for the sole benefit of the bailee, a higher duty of care is expected: even slight negligence is actionable; where the bailment is for the benefit of the bailor, liability attaches if gross negligence has occurred. For bailments of mutual benefit, ordinary negligence is the standard of care required for the bailee.

Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830

If the plaintiff can prove that the two defendants were negligent (one had to have caused his loss) and it is impossible to prove which one, then the burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants.

Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830

(1) If the plaintiff can prove that the two defendants were negligent (one had to have caused his loss) and it is impossible to prove which one, then the burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants.

(2) In such a circumstance, there is no joint tortfeasance when two parties are engaged in a lawful common enterprise, and it is proven that one of them caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party actually did it, unless there are special circumstances of agency in the parties' relationship (e.g. master and servant, employer and employee, principle and agent), in which case both parties may be found liable for the resulting damages; i.e., found to be joint tortfeasors.